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Abstract 
Since Trump’s election, multipolarity seems to be inducing an abatement of multilateralism. Why? This 
paper intends to explain this paradox by applying Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action to Trump’s 
Trade Policy. Olson predicted that in a social game in which the number of actors increases significantly, 
dominant actors dispose of two main resources to limit the number of free riders: rewards and coercion. 
By applying this hypothesis to Trump’s trade policy, it becomes clear that Trump wants to reduce the 
rewards offered to his partners, as he deems them excessive. Furthermore, he considers that the rules 
and norms of the world trading system limit the United States’ ability to coerce its partners. For this 
reason, the aim of Trump’s trade policy is to unbind the United States from the constraints of the 
multilateral trade system. 
Keywords 
Multipolarity, multilateralism, trade, Trump, Europe , Olson 
  1 
Introduction1 
In an increasingly multipolar world, where wealth and power are distributed among a greater number of 
actors, one would expect that multilateralism (which is to be understood as the normative regulation of 
international relations through legitimate international institutions), would emerge as the most effective 
and obvious means of regulating a game that is, by definition, more open2. However, the reverse appears 
to be unfolding: multipolarity seems to be inducing an abatement of multilateralism. This is the paradox 
that we need to understand.  
To this end, one might naturally look at the Trump factor. However, as important as this factor may 
be, it does not fully explain the phenomenon, far from it. To make sense of and formalise this paradox, 
one must go further. In so doing, we must rediscover Mancur Olson, since the international system is 
confronted with the classical collective action dilemma that he had identified in his day3. Returning to 
Olson is all the more pertinent considering that he was commissioned by the United States Department 
of Defense to apply his model to the study of burden sharing within the Atlantic Alliance.4 The 
conclusions reached during that study were very similar to those laid out in his book5. Yet, in our view, 
the former has thus far not been mobilised to understand and interpret Olson in the domain of 
international politics, nor to analyse multilateralism. Beginning with Olson, therefore, is of double 
interest to us. First of all, he helps us to understand why the bigger the group, and the more it is 
constituted of small actors, the less able it is to generate collective action. Secondly, Olson tells us that 
this constraint cannot be overcome unless there are more powerful actors capable of compelling free 
riders to participate in the game through incentives or sanctions6. Applied to international relations, this 
hypothesis implies that multipolarity, resulting from an increased number of actors, is not necessarily 
conducive to the establishment of multilateralism as a cooperative structure that regulates relations 
between these actors. The aim of this article is therefore to interpret Olson’s hypothesis in light of the 
unilateral measures taken by Trump with regards to trade7. 
                                                     
1
 An initial version of this paper was presented at a June 20, 2018 workshop at the European University Institute, The 
Governance of International Trade, Reshape or Demise? 
2
 A standard definition of multilateralism might be “the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more 
states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions”. Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for 
Research”. International Journal Autumn 45, No. 4 (1990): 731. While simple, this definition requires further qualification. 
Multilateralism is not solely a function of the number of participating actors, as any arrangement between three states would 
therefore automatically be categorised as an exercise in multilateralism. However, we know that states establish 
arrangements that run counter the principles of multilateralism. For instance, if Russia reaches an agreement on Syria with 
Iran and Turkey, while vetoing resolutions put forward in the Security Council, it would be difficult to conceive of this 
arrangement as multilateral. Conversely, a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Japan is considered multilateral, 
because it is compliant with the rules set out by the WTO. In order to evaluate the multilateral nature of an action or 
agreement, one must not only consider the number of actors, but the extent to which the arrangements are compatible with 
the institutions with which they are supposed to comply. The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Accords, from the 
Iranian Nuclear deal, UNESCO and other unilateral trade measures, run against the arrangements established under the 
auspices of international institutions. 
3
 Mancur Olson The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing with new preface 
and appendix. Vol. 124. Harvard University Press, 2009. 
4
 Mancur Olson et Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances”, The review of economics and statistics (1966) 
266-279.  
5
 According to this model, in an alliance or international organization composed of nations acting in their national interests, 
there will be a general tendency for the larger nations to bear disproportionately large shares of the costs, and for the smaller 
nations to make little or no contribution to the common cause”. art cit  
6
 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, op cit 
7
 I have laid out this hypothesis in: Zaki Laïdi "Towards a post-hegemonic world: The multipolar threat to the multilateral 
order." International Politics 51, No. 3, 2014: 350-365. 
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Like to Olson, one might say, Trump considers that there are “free riders” who derive benefits from 
the system to the United States’ detriment8. While this point of contention had been highlighted by 
Trump’s predecessors,9 he was the first to enact measures designed to unbind the United States from 
some of the constraints engendered by its participation in multilateralism. Consequently, the United 
States is no longer able to fully exert its hegemonic power, and yet it remains powerful enough to inflict 
losses upon its partners who remain constrained by the rules of multilateralism. Therefore, the biggest 
actor of the international system, unable to constrain “free riders”, decides to free ride itself, taking the 
risk of dismantling the whole architecture. Here lies the potential rupture introduced by Trump. We must 
therefore explain the ways in which the Trump phenomenon interacts with the structural dynamics that 
have proven a significant problem to Europe, especially since Europe’s only defence against the strength 
of the United States, are norms10.  
This text is structured in the following manner, the first section will analyse the ways in which Trump 
is orchestrating the United States’ withdrawal from multilateralism, the second section will interpret 
these measures through the prism of Olson’s hypothesis. Finally, the third section will highlight the 
obstacles to a complete dismantling of the multilateral trade system, though, certain actors (Europe, for 
instance) will still find themselves weakened by these new dynamics.  
The Trump Factor 
In the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s electoral victory, it was reasonable to wonder if he would 
prove to be “more bark than bite” once in office. It was believed and hoped, that many of the Presidents 
stated positions would be moderated by the restraint demanded of American power and the pursuit of 
American interests. There would certainly be changes, but it was assumed that they would be at the 
margins. Indeed, it was believed that credence had been given to this hypothesis since, once in office, 
President Trump back-peddled on his campaign promise to declare China a “currency manipulator”. A 
year into Trump’s presidency, however, it has become clear that his virulent criticism of multilateralism, 
which he has accused of running counter to the United States’ interests, is being followed by deeds.  
After announcing the U.S.’ withdrawal from TPP, (which was later ratified without the US) President 
Trump launched an offensive against the WTO which he accused of usurping American sovereignty11. 
Historically, however, it was the United States that had ensured that by design, the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanisms would be binding.12 Unable to renege on this provision without leaving the 
WTO, the Trump administration has opted instead to asphyxiate the institution by blocking the 
nomination of the arbitration panellists required for dispute settlement processes to function13. Trump is 
                                                     
8
 Refer to Donald Trump’s tweet: “Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for 
the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany “. Donald Trump, Twitter Post, March 18, 2017. 
9
 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, The Atlantic, April 2016. Jeffrey Goldberg highlights Barack Obama’s 
indictment of so-called “free riders” during their interview: “Free riders aggravate me,” he told me. Recently, Obama 
warned that Great Britain would no longer be able to claim a “special relationship” with the United States if it did not 
commit to spending at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense. “You have to pay your fair share,” Obama told David Cameron, 
who subsequently met the 2 percent threshold.” 
10
 Since the European Union is not a state, but a multilateral institution, by design it favours multilateralism as opposed to 
rapports purely based on power dynamics, cf. Zaki Laïdi, Norms over Force. the enigma of European power. Palgrave, 
2008 
11
 Ana Swanson, “Once the W.T.O.’s Biggest Supporter, U.S. Is Its Biggest Skeptic,” New York Times, Dec 10, 2017  
12
 James Bacchus, “Might Unmakes Right. The American Assault on the Rule of Law in World Trade”, Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, CIGI Papers, No. 173, May 2018 
13
 The WTO’s strength is derived from the fact that states are required to comply with the rulings of the Organisation’s dispute 
settlement mechanism, either by modifying their behaviour or by financially compensating the claimant if they do not wish 
to correct course. The US has been critical of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), not quite because of its rulings, 
since the U.S. has won approximately 85% of the disputes that they have brought to the WTO, but more so because of the 
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also engaged in a demonstration of strength vis-à-vis the signatories of NAFTA on the one hand, and a 
wrestling match with Europe on the other, by hiking up tariffs on steel and aluminium, even though 
Europe is by no means responsible for the surplus of Chinese steel in global markets. He has also given 
Beijing a trade ultimatum and, in a near colonial fashion, demanded that China increase its imports from 
the United States14. Finally, he has drastically reduced the number of multilateral programs to which the 
United States is granting funding15. The potential amount of trade concerned by Trump’s trade sanctions 
may reach the staggering figure of 550 billion dollars.16 It is the biggest application of tariffs by the US 
and effecting US since Smoot-Hawley.17 
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, has removed any doubt that he 
intends to pursue a nationalistic agenda that defies the multilateral institutions that the U.S. itself played 
a leading role in creating and sustaining since 1945. In a rather spectacular manner, the U.S. has sought 
to undermine the UN, NATO as well as the WTO and of course other high profile ad hoc agreements, 
for example the Paris Climate Accords and the aforementioned Iran Nuclear Deal.  
The United States’ distrust of multilateralism, particularly in the area of trade, predates Donald 
Trump. This age-old feature of American politics is the result of the peculiar history of the United States: 
the U.S. is one of few countries in the world to be born of a trade war. For this reason, trade regulation 
features in the very first article of the United States Constitution, as a crucial function of the state18. 
Trade is thus considered a pillar of national sovereignty. In fact, John Adams considered that the 
declaration of Congress in April 1776 that put an end to the authority of the British Parliament over the 
regulation of trade of the 13 states, was the foundational act of the United States’ independence19. This 
element is often omitted from political analyses of Trump, when it is in fact fundamental. Conversely, 
in Europe, trade policy had been “communitarised” since 1957 as it was considered that given the 
convergence of interests in Europe on trade matters, sovereignty sharing in this domain would be 
required.  
The prominence of trade in American public discourse can be further explained by two more factors. 
The first is related to the geographies of economic specialisation within the United States. Since the U.S. 
system of political representation is based on states, the different economic realities among states will 
have different political repercussions. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Trump owes his electoral 
success to the Midwest, where the steel industry, which has been hard hit by international competition, 
is concentrated20. The third key factor is the absence of national welfare and the sharp increase of 
unemployment which has meant that trade liberalisation has had greater social repercussions in the U.S. 
than in Europe21. Trump’s approach is problematic, not least because there is but a tenuous link between 
trade deficits and trade policy. A deficit reflects a surplus of consumption over savings, more than 
anything else. If the United States wishes to reduce its deficit, it needs to increase savings. The reverse 
                                                     
role of the DBS in interpreting law which the U.S. considers an affront to American sovereignty. The crucial point here is 
that the U.S. has difficulties accepting rulings that originate outside of the United States. This is an outlook as narrow as 
the continuous pursuit of the extraterritorial expansion of American law. Another reason that the U.S. has been critical of 
the DBS is that it often loses when taken to the WTO for excessive anti-dumping practices. 
14
 Martin Wolf, “Donald Trump declares trade war on China,” Financial Times, May 8, 2018 
15
 Scott Morris, “The Incredible Shrinking US Multilateralism,” Centre For Global Development, Feb 13, 2018  
16
 The Associated Press, “Trump's Tariffs: What They Are and How They Will Work”, New York Times, July 6, 2018 
17
 Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2018  
18
 The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress has the power “To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;” U.S. Constitution. art I, sec 8, clause 3 
19
 Douglas Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy, University of Chicago Press, 2017: 46 
20
 Autor David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, Kaveh Majlesi, “A Note on the Effect of the Rising Trade Exposure on the 
2016 Presidential Election”, Appendix to Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi “Importing Political Polarization? The 
Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure”, 2017 
21
 Cf. see Dani Rodrik, Straight Talk on Trade. Ideas for a Sane World Economy, Princeton University Press, 2017. 
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applies to countries with a trade surplus. Germany for example, exports much more than it imports 
because Germans save much more than they invest. Furthermore, a trade deficit alone is of no particular 
significance, per se, as there is no correlation between employment levels and trade deficits22. Currently 
the United States has a very high trade deficit and very low unemployment. Trade becomes of political 
salience due to the unequal social distribution of the benefits of trade, which are linked to the sometimes-
devastating impact of technology and trade on employment. Taxation and labour policy have a much 
greater impact on the redistribution of the benefits of trade, than trade policy. The United States’ trade 
union for the aluminium industry has strongly opposed Trump’s punitive tariff sanctions against Canada 
and Europe, for obvious economic reasons23. The rationality of Trump’s protectionist trade policies has 
thus been contested by groups that are supposed to benefit from these policies. This confirms that 
Trump’s preferences are fundamentally biased as a result of ideology24.  
However, this too is not new. The true novelty of the U.S.’ current trade policy is twofold. Firstly, 
there is an averred desire to substitute the multilateral system based on rules and institutions that 
guarantee the application of these rules (rules-based system), with a system based on the pursuit of 
outcomes that are quantifiably beneficial to the United States (outcomes-based system)25. In other 
words, it would no longer matter that international rules are upheld. What would matter is that, for 
example, the U.S. succeed in reducing its trade deficit by any means, even though no economist would 
concede that the there is even the slightest link between trade policy and trade deficits26.  
Consider Trump’s volte-face regarding the Chinese technology firm, ZTE. Initially, his 
administration banned the company from American markets due to previous violations of U.S. sanctions 
against Iran and North Korea. Trump then abruptly instructed the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
reconsider the ban, presumably in the hopes of securing assurances from the Chinese government that 
they would increase imports of American goods and not increase tariffs on American sorghum. In the 
meanwhile, one might imagine that Trump had discovered that this Chinese company was an important 
client for American companies that produce the components that ZTE uses for its phones. These firms 
would have therefore been strongly impacted if they were not able to trade with ZTE. Thus, while Trump 
endeavours to reclaim the U.S. sovereignty, he risks undoing the ties of economic interdependence that 
link the two greatest economic powers on earth.  
The second novelty is Trump’s redefinition of the very notion of “alliance”. Bush completely 
disregarded the rules of multilateralism when he declared war on Iraq, as had many of his predecessors 
before him. Yet, while Bush did endeavour to divide his allies (in a bid to secure the legitimacy needed 
to carry out a military intervention in the absence of international consensus) he certainly did not 
underestimate the need for American allies. 
Trump’s rationale is completely different. Mounting a political or strategic defence to protect the 
U.S.’ allies is not a priority for him. The onus is on the states that consider themselves allies of the 
United States, to make concessions that benefit the U.S., in exchange for its protection. The notion of 
alliance has thus taken on a new meaning: the United-States no longer considers that it has 
responsibilities vis-à-vis its partners, with which there are shared values and interests. It is now 
                                                     
22
 Robert Lawrence, “Five Reasons Why the Focus on Trade Deficits is Misleading”, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Policy Brief 18-6, 2018  
23
 Aluminum Association “Aluminum Association Disappointed in Administration Decision to Place Tariffs on Vital Trading 
Partners,” May 31, 2018, http://www.aluminum.org/news/aluminum-association-disappointed-administration-decision-
place-tariffs-vital-trading-partners 
24
 It is however, surprising that American business does not appear to be galvanised against Trump’s trade policies. Two 
hypotheses can be put forward: the first is that the measures that are implemented are more moderate than the measures 
announced. The renegotiation of the agreement with Korea KORUS would point in that direction. A second hypothesis 
might be that American business are satisfied with Trump’s fiscal policies, which have been very favourable to them. 
25
 Bacchus, “Might Unmakes Right - The American Assault on the Rule of Law in World Trade,” op cit. 
26
 Maurice Obstfeld, “Targeting Specific Trade Deficits is a Game of Whack-A-Mole,” Financial Times, April 22, 2018.  
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incumbent upon its allies to prove that they are worthy of American cooperation. Otherwise, they are 
considered cumbersome burdens27. What has resulted, is a kind of test of either a state’s willingness to 
grant trade concessions to the U.S., or to increase its financial contributions to the functioning of 
NATO28.  
It is no coincidence that Trump’s tariff increases were first applied to American allies that depend 
most on guaranties of strategic support from the U.S., ie South Korea, Japan, and Europe. It is also not 
a coincidence that national security has been cited as a justification for these measures. The message is 
clear: your ally status is no longer a guarantee of protection, on the contrary it is accompanied by 
conditions. Another noteworthy determinant of Trump’s trade policy is his near visceral hatred of the 
European Union, which he considers a political heresy as it requires that member states operate beyond 
the logic of national sovereignty. This hostility toward Europe had in fact been articulated by John 
Bolton about twenty years ago29. What has become clear is that, if Europe had aligned itself with Trump 
and denounced the Iran Nuclear Deal, the punitive tariff sanction on steel would have been lifted. Thus, 
for Trump, abandoning multilateralism has a specific purpose, it enables him to deliberately extract trade 
concessions in exchange for American protection. This approach has been particularly hard hitting for 
Germany, as it is a country with an unmatched trade surplus, very low military expenditures and an 
aversion to international conflicts30.  
Does this necessarily mean that multilateralism will be reinvigorated once the Trump factor is 
removed? Nothing is less certain, because while Trump’s accession to office may have accelerated and 
amplified the crisis of multilateralism, the vulnerability of this system precedes Trump for structural 
reasons that we will now explore.  
Mancur Olson’s Hypothesis 
As previously stated, one would think that a multipolar world is destined to lead to the emergence of 
multilateral governance. Yet, the reverse phenomenon appears to be unfolding. The Doha Round 
negotiations initiated in 2001, failed. Even attempts to establish agreements of a more limited scope 
appear to be in jeopardy, for example the inter-ministerial conference that took place in Buenos Aires 
in 2017, was a fruitless, in spite of the fact that the agenda was particularly restricted. India has once 
again opposed an agreement on fisheries subsidies, and the United States has refused to sign on to the 
conference’s final communiqué as it highlighted the crucial role of the WTO in regulating international 
trade31.  
Yet, the deadlocks that hinder the functioning of the WTO cannot solely be ascribed to Trump’s 
policies. This would serve only to further misrepresent a phenomenon that has been abundantly 
caricatured. The Doha Round met its demise in 2008, in Geneva, under the Obama administration due 
to the stalemate reached as a result of a resistance mounted by both the United States and India, on a 
decidedly minor issue area: agricultural subsidies. In order to explain this gridlock, the U.S deployed an 
argument that barely differs from Donald Trump’s, albeit conveyed in a less aggressive manner32. Since 
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 Michael Hayden, ‘We Have a President Who Views Allies as a Burden’, Der Spiegel, May 11, 2018 
28
 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trumps Warns NATO Allies to Spend More on Defense, or Else” New York Times, July 2, 2018 
29
 John Bolton, “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?” Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 1: No. 2, 
Article 2, 2000: 205-221 
30
 Martin Hesse, Peter Müller, Christian Reiermann, “American Roulette - Trump Tricks Trade Partners into a Dangerous 
Game”, Der Spiegel, May 5, 2018  
31
 James Bacchus, “Was Buenos Aires the Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning? The Future of the World Trade 
Organization”, CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 841, 2018 
32
 Susan Schwab , “After Doha: Why the negotiations are doomed and what we should do about it,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 
2011 
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2008, the United States observed that the WTO was not able to contain China’s meteoric rise and decided 
that it was necessary to deploy measures outside of the multilateral system in order to contain its rival. 
This was the rationale behind the now defunct TTIP, which was to be developed in partnership with 
Europe. 
Since Trump is not the only factor in this crisis of multilateralism, how else can it be explained? In 
order to begin to sketch out an answer to this question, one might begin with the hypothesis formulated 
by Mancur Olson in his acclaimed book, The Logic of Collective Action33. While he was not specifically 
referring to the multilateralism, Olson states that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite 
small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests34.” 
If we were to simply replace “individuals” with “states,” we would effectively reach the same 
conclusion regarding the increasingly multipolar international system. According to Olson, an increase 
of the number of actors does not necessarily result in the pursuit of common solutions unless there are 
incentives or means of coercion to convince actors to remain in the game and to abide by its rules. 
Furthermore, he considers that in the absence of an agreement between multiple actors, there may be 
free riding, that is to say that there may be actors that benefit from the system without bearing the costs35. 
“Free riding” is precisely the word Trump constantly uses to castigate his allies. Trump probably never 
heard of Olson. But he is undoubtedly relying on his analysis to make his point.  
Indeed, when we transpose Olson’s hypothesis on to the multilateral trade system, we see that the 
relevance of this hypothesis is easily demonstrated. Trade is the area in which power is most dispersed. 
Furthermore, the two instruments that regulated state behaviour, that is to say incentives and coercion, 
are much less effective than they used to be. We would therefore put forward the following hypothesis: 
the reason why multipolarity is not necessarily conducive to multilateralism is because in a multipolar 
world there, is no hegemonic actor strong enough to impose its vision or to convince the other actors to 
accept the terms of the game. At the same time, there are no instruments of coercion beyond the decisions 
reached through trade arbitration. Obama wanted to counter China’s rise, through the negotiation of the 
TTIP with Europe. He wanted to contain China through the structures of the world trade system. Since 
this strategy failed, Trump has concluded that coercion only works if multilateralism is abandoned. The 
United States is thus no longer strong enough to dominate the game of international trade, but is 
formidable once it begins to take measures outside of multilateral structures. 
To further develop this hypothesis let us consider the GATT era. Between 1947 and 1995 the 
international trade system was dominated in turn by the United States, then by the United States and 
Europe, and finally by the United States, Europe and Japan. The dynamic that played out from one 
negotiation Round to the next, reflected the evolution of the balance of power between western trading 
partners, particularly with the establishment of common market, and the rise of Japan as an economic 
power36.  
At the time, negotiations addressed almost exclusively the reduction of tariffs on industrial goods, as 
agriculture trade was hardly addressed. This was clearly not of major concern to China and the USSR 
as they were not signatories of the GATT. As for developing countries, while the number signatories 
increased over the decades, their political influence remained limited. Furthermore, developing 
countries disposed of two main incentives: the presumed benefits associated with the Most Favoured 
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 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, op.cit  
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 ibid 
35  ibid  
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 Richard Baldwin, “The World Trade Organisation and the Future of Multilateralism”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 30: No. 1, 2016: 95–116 
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Nation (MFN) clause on the one hand, and Special and Differential Treatment provision37. The MFN 
clause is the most important provision in international trade, because it means that any tariff-related 
advantage conceded to one country, must be automatically conceded the rest of the signatories of the 
GATT.  
In other words, the MFN clause prevents discrimination between participants of the international 
trade system, as such, it is a foundational provision. Since this clause obliges the U.S. to grant the same 
advantages to all of its trade partners, it has become a key point of contention as the U.S. engages in 
trade negotiations, because Trump’s stated objective is precisely to discriminate against his trade 
partners in order to influence their behaviour38.  
As it pertains to Special and Differential Treatment, which is a provision that has long permitted 
developing countries to benefit from non-reciprocal access to western markets, it is an optimal 
arrangement for both parties under the GATT. Developed countries set the terms for preferential access 
to their markets, and developing countries benefit immensely from favourable market access conditions: 
“They were free riders who liked the ride39”.  
This asymmetrical relationship was undone by the establishment of the WTO, followed by the 
accession of China to the Organisation. Industrialised-developed countries have not only become 
outnumbered, but the power asymmetry is reduced by the economic rise of emerging economies. When 
China joined the WTO it accounted for 3% of global trade. In 2017 this figure rose to 15%40. Today the 
US, the EU and China are virtually on par as trading powers and represent around 16% of world trade 
respectively. This is an enormous and unprecedented change in terms of distribution of power over such 
a short period of time. The current power distribution within the WTO is a far cry from what it was 
fifteen years ago. As such, the global trade agenda has come to reflect not only the preferences and the 
priorities of the developed countries, but of those of emerging economies as well. Therefore, in an 
institution where consensus and the principle of single undertaking41 prevail, there must be an extremely 
strong incentive for the actors to agree to sign a general agreement.  
This is what currently lacks as the anticipated economic gains from trade liberalisation are no longer 
as spectacular as they used to be, yet the political and social costs have increased. Effectively, the 
downfall of the WTO is that it was established as a “super-GATT” at a time when global trade was 
headed in a different direction.  
Indeed, the succession of failed or gridlocked negotiations since the late 90s is symptomatic of 
profound crisis, beginning with the failure of the Seattle conference in 1999 which followed by the last-
minute initiation of the Doha Round in 2001, probably as a result of September 11, then failure of 
Cancun in 2003 where emerging economies formed a block against the preliminary agreement on 
agricultural subsidies that had secretly been negotiated by the U.S. and Europe beforehand. The Hong 
Kong Conference in 2005 was but a partial success and was followed by the complete collapse of the 
Geneva Round in 2008. Indeed, this chronology shows that that the failure of multilateral negotiations 
at the WTO was a long time in the making. While the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism., remains a 
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relevant and effective instrument for now, it is at risk of being undermined by the United States offensive 
against the Organisation. The threat to the WTO is very real as the Trump administration continues to 
asphyxiate the dispute settlement mechanism by deliberately blocking the selection of the arbitration 
panellists42.  
Because there is no longer a hegemonic power in the international system, each actor may derive 
different meanings and conclusions on the correct course of action. That is not to say that there is a 
systematic rejection of multilateralism, however there is a proliferation of different interpretations of 
the form that multilateralism should take. China, for example, continues to support the WTO, because 
it considers that the rules that prevailed in the Organisation when China became a member were 
favourable and should remain unchanged. The Europeans however, disagree. While they remain in 
favour of multilateralism, they consider that the rules under which China joined the Organisation in 
2001, are no longer appropriate for the China of 2018. The rules should therefore be modified to reflect 
China’s new economic standing. Indeed, China presents on the one hand characteristics of a market 
economy but is also the manifestation of an economy that has flourished because the state has thrown 
its full support behind Chinese producers and taken a very hands-on approach in helping them to capture 
global markets. This has been detrimental to European and American producers who are not subsidised 
by the state43. The Chinese have been very careful to adhere to the rulings of the WTO, even when they 
run counter to Chinese interests, all the while benefiting from India’s objections and attempts to block 
multilateral agreements. Furthermore, China continues to refuse to reconsider its policy on state 
subsidies and has yet to demand that its producers respect the international regulations on intellectual 
property. India is also a strong supporter of multilateralism and the WTO and has been very vocal about 
its opposition to America’s policies. However, they would like to continue along the path of 
multilateralism as long the principle of Special and Differential Treatment is preserved44. As such, 
emerging markets continue to support this brand of multilateralism and block the establishment of 
plurilateral agreements that have proven useful in overcoming gridlocks that may arise from an “all or 
nothing” approach45. India would like to secure assurances that western markets will remain open, 
particularly for its qualified workforce, however, it does not feel bound to open its industrial sectors to 
international competition as they remain highly protected46.  
This brings us back to Olson. Since there are no hegemons that can legitimately impose their vision 
on the other actors, the only way to preserve the multilateral system is to offer the actors within the 
system either incentives or to coerce them. Incentives will no longer be effective because, as we have 
seen, western countries have concluded that unilateral concessions made by developed countries to 
developing countries and China are no longer defendable from an economic standpoint considering 
recent economic developments in beneficiary countries. Trump takes this critique even further as he 
considers that the U.S. should renege on concessions that the United States had granted Europe and 
Japan in the 1950s under the auspices of the GATT47. In Trump’s view, emerging economies should 
also be considered as equals of industrialised-developed economies and preferential treatment should 
not continue to be granted to them. Incentives are therefore no longer acceptable.  
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That leaves us with coercion, which is precisely the path that Trump has chosen, since he considers 
that multilateralism provides too many protections for the rivals of the United States. Unilateral 
measures aim then at increasing U.S. leverage on partners which benefit unduly from multilateral 
protection48. Moreover, unilateral measures allow the U.S. to combine at the same time trade protection 
with investment protection. Here we use the term “rival” because according to Trump, any country, even 
trading partners, that has a trade surplus vis a vis the United States, is to be considered a rival. In Trump’s 
view, trade deficits are synonymous with loss of jobs. This has been at the root of the stand-off between 
the U.S. and China, the outcome of which has yet to be determined. What is clear is that whatever the 
outcome, it will be negotiated on a purely bilateral basis.  
It is reasonable that Trump pursue a new relationship with China. It would be in Europe’s interest to 
do the same. However, on the China question, there are clear divergences between Europe and the 
United States that have given way to noteworthy concerns. Divergences result from the US’ refusal to 
establish a joint strategy vis a vis China, even though this would be strategically beneficial for all western 
trading partners. The concern is therefore that the U.S. may strike bilateral deals that impact Europe 
negatively. Canada has expressed similar concerns, as, like Europe, it remains a strong supporter of 
multilateralism and fears that continued demonstrations of hard power will damage it. If for example, 
China commits to importing more American goods, this may be detrimental for European producers that 
compete with American producers in Chinese markets. Furthermore, if the Chinese agree to further 
include American companies in China’s 2025 program, this concession could be to the detriment of 
European companies, because an increase in imports from the US, means a decrease in imports from 
elsewhere. If the agreements reached between China and the United States are informal and non-
transparent, it will be difficult for their trading partners to discern the actual nature of the discriminatory 
arrangement.  
Will deconstruction of trade multilateralism remain limited? 
In the short run, the likelihood of a complete collapse of the international trade system, followed by 
generalised protectionism, appears to be limited for the following reasons.  
The first is that even though the WTO may be in crisis, the fundamental rules that structure 
international trade will continue to be applied. These rules, passed down from the GATT, are adhered 
to every day across the globe without much difficulty. The most important rule, as we have seen, is the 
MFN clause, even though the U.S. has been vocal about its criticism of this provision. Suppose that the 
Chinese decide to reduce tariffs on automobiles in order to satisfy the United States. They would not be 
able to adopt this measure unless it were to be applied to all of its trading partners, and therefore to the 
most prominent exporters of cars to China, i.e. German and Japanese companies. These firms would 
therefore benefit from a reduction of tariffs much more so than American firms. That said, if Trump 
were to decide to follow Mr. Ross’ suggestion and reject the MFN clause or disregard bounded tariffs, 
a period of unexpected deregulation of international trade would follow. What is more, the sanctions 
imposed on China, a trade war resulting from automobile tariffs and the breakdown of NAFTA, could 
mark the beginning of a disastrous downward spiral for international trade49. Politics can significantly 
impact the parameters of international trade in unexpected ways, and it is better to anticipate change 
rather than to rely on the demands of trade to ensure continuity.  
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The second reason is that global value chains have been profoundly transformed international trade. 
The schematic according to which a country exports a finished product to another country is almost 
obsolete50. Consider German cars for example, as Donald Trump has stated that he would like to apply 
high tariffs to them. Out of the 1.3 million German cars that are sold to the United States, 800 000 were 
produced in the U.S.51. Taxing these cars would therefore have but a limited effect on American import 
demand. The prominence of the intra company trade reduces the importance of trade balances as, 
currently, exported products have high import content. This is why it is believed that an increase of 
tariffs on imported inputs would harm the American automobile industry52. As has been demonstrated 
by many economists, the U.S.’ deficit vis-à-vis China would be 33% lower if it took into account the 
value-added trade balance as opposed to its trade balance.  
Let's take another example. An iPhone exported from China to the United States will be accounted 
for as a Chinese export valued at five hundred dollars, for instance. The Chinese value added for phone 
is barely twenty-five dollars. When Europe sells an Airbus, it boasts having captured market share that 
could have gone to Boeing. However, 50% of the Airbus’ value-added originates from subcontractors 
in the United States. The reverse is also true. When Boeings are sold half of the profit goes to European 
subcontractors. In reality, the most accurate measure of international trade is the balance of value-added, 
as opposed to trade balances calculated for finished products.53 Value chains are the most effective 
instrument against protectionism because by increasing tariffs on imported inputs, the price of products 
that require these inputs increases. 
Having said that, one must remain cautious. If the U.S.’ government were to follow through on its 
threat to increase tariffs, European manufacturing plants may be relocated to the United States. This too 
may be one of Trump’s political objectives, though there is a risk that American companies may be 
tempted to leave the United States in order to avoid the repercussions of increased tariffs in Europe or 
elsewhere54. 
Finally, the third reason is that the momentum behind trade negotiations has not stalled even though 
multilateral negotiations have reached a stalemate and have no doubt become obsolete. Furthermore, we 
are observing the emergence of plurilateral and regional dynamics55. Plurilateral agreements, unlike 
multilateral agreements, concern matters that are very specific and only binds countries for which there 
is a shared interest in reaching an agreement on those matters56. For example, there is an extremely 
important plurilateral agreement regarding access to markets for public services, but that many states 
have yet to sign. These agreements are not a cure-all solution and they have challenges too, as 
demonstrated by the fact that a missing signatory of this agreement is none other than China! Yet, 
countries around the world are specifically waiting for China to sign on to the agreement. Europeans are 
concerned that, amongst other things, China will dominate some of the public service markets in Central 
and Eastern Europe thanks to bilateral agreements with states in these regions and will disregard the 
rules of public sector markets that have been laid out by the Union’s legislature57.  
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To summarise, the international trade system has reached a crisis point, but the consequences can be 
substantially mitigated, firstly, thanks to the current structure of global trade which is dominated by 
trade between firms as opposed to trade between states. Furthermore, the perfusion of regional and 
plurilateral negotiations may be a means of overcoming the obstacles that have stifled negotiations at a 
global level, as was demonstrated by the fate of TPP. Once the United states announced its withdrawal 
from the treaty, the other signatories rushed to sign the treaty without the United States. The growth of 
international trade appears to be unstoppable.  
That which applies to trade does not necessarily apply to international security, however. In the case 
of the Iran Nuclear Deal, there is no alternative to the withdrawal of the U.S., unless of course, Europe, 
Russia, and China, succeed in convincing Iran to continue to meet its commitments to the international 
community while continuing to face American sanctions of which the extraterritorial implications are 
well known.  
What goes for Iran, also applies to Syria. Thus far, there has been no incentive for Russia to reach a 
multilateral agreement to end the Syrian conflict as this would result in the re-entrance of the West into 
the conflict, when Russia’s whole objective was to side-line the West. The Trump administration seems 
none the less satisfied with the status quo especially since the Syrian president Bachar Al-Assad controls 
60% of the territory, the Kurdish forces, which are supported by the United States, control the most 
prosperous parts of the country, located in the north and in the east, where the oil reserves, gas and water 
are concentrated58. 
In fact, instead of speaking in terms of multipolarity, it might be more pertinent to speak of a “double 
bipolarity”. On the one hand, the economic sphere is increasingly dominated by the United States and 
China, on the other hand the geopolitical sphere is dominated by the United States and Russia. The crisis 
of multilateralism is based on the superposition of these spheres. The first dynamic is based on the 21st 
century rivalry between the United States and China. The second is a continuation of the 20th century 
rivalry between the U.S. and Russia which has re-emerged after a twenty-year hiatus. In both cases, 
Europe exists only at the margins of this dual rivalry and its involvement in these spheres has fallen 
short of its full potential. The fear is that the this may bare consequences for Europe. As such, when 
international relations are based solely on pure power politics, multilateralism retreats, and with it, so 
does Europe.  
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